to explore the causal relationship between various aspects of state-making and tax revolts.' Both state-making and revolt are the result of choices, and these choices are always made in light of the anticipated reactions of other actors. Rulers consider the possibility of revolt when they think about raising taxes or pursuing unpopular policies. In deciding whether to revolt, subjects consider both the likelihood of rulers using repression and their other options for decreasing their tax burden, such as tax evasion. The determinants of the costs of tax evasion, in part a function of rulers' decisions about administrative techniques, must thus also be part of a model of revolt.
To provide a rough heuristic model of the relationship between state-making and revolt, we use a game theoretic decision tree.
The extensive form of game theory highlights the sequential nature of interaction, and thus precisely specifies the relationships between various aspects of state-making (war, taxation, and administrative centralization) and revolt. We use the model in a limited way: We look at the state-making process from the point of view of subjects. Explaining the actions of rulers (such as tax increases and war-making) that initiate the process is beyond the scope of this paper. 2 We test the relationship between aspects of state-making and revolt mainly via quantitative analyses of revolts in France between 1515 and 1789. Early modern France is a useful case in which to explore these relationships for several reasons. First, many of the classic historical studies of state-making and revolt cited above focus on this case, allowing us to draw on their insights in constructing our models and to compare their qualitative findings with our more quantitative results. Second, early modern France contains ample variation in the main aspects of state-making (levels of taxation, war, administrative centralization) and tax revolts, facilitating the testing of our arguments.
Because tax rates and rates of revolt (among other things) varied substantially across provinces (Brustein and Levi 1987; Collins 1994 :20; Major 1994:xviii; Markoff 1996:37; Mousnier 1979:641),3 it is important to supplement our analysis with an examination of these relationships at the provincial level.4 We focus on Guyenne, the province in which revolt occurred most frequently in early modem France-almost onethird of the revolts in France occurred there. Guyenne is also a useful case because it allows us to explore in more detail the important fiscal and administrative changes in the Pays d'Etat (provinces retaining provincial legislative assemblies in the sixteenth century) in southern France in the early seventeenth century. Because it is not possible to get quantitative data at the provincial level for our entire period (especially for tax rates, prices, and population), we do not reproduce our statistical analysis for Guyenne. However, we do have sufficient data to roughly test whether the same causal dynamics operate at national and provincial levels.
STATE-MAKING AND REVOLT AS STRATEGIC INTERACTION
We begin with two simple assumptions about the interests of actors.5 The rulers (i.e., chief executives) of states want to maximize tax revenue while maintaining security of rule (Kiser 1994; Levi 1988; North 1981 ). Taxpayers collectively want public goods like security and social order that require taxation, but individually they want to minimize their tax burden.6 Using these assumptions, and information and arguments from the historical literature to specify the structural conditions within which these actors were embedded, we first outline propositions about how taxes, war, and centralization affected revolt in France, and then we construct a model showing how these factors are interrelated.
TAXATION AND REVOLT
Several scholars have argued that there is a relationship between levels of taxation and 2An adequate test of the game-theoretic model as a whole would require both endogenizing the choices of rulers by explaining both tax rates and policy choices, and using comparative cases to show the conditions under which state-making goes down paths not followed in the French case. 3Although aggregated data on French taxation have been used as a measure of the tax burden in several exemplary historical analyses (Braudel 1972 4 Our intent is not to reproduce Brustein and Levi's (1987) masterful analysis of the geography of revolt-an analysis of one province would not allow us to do that. We supplement their work by focusing on the timing of revolt. 5 The following discussion, based on these assumptions, outlines a stylized model of strategic interaction, and should not be taken as a historical description. 6 It is, of course, a simplification to group all taxpayers together, but the fact that most early modern tax revolts, in France and elsewhere, were class collaboration revolts involving a broad cross-section of subjects (Barkey 1991 Zagorin 1982) . Our model suggests that this relationship is produced by two micro-level causal mechanisms. Rulers will try to get as much tax revenue as they can without inciting revolts (because revolts threaten their security and are costly to suppress), and they will attempt to find nontax sources of revenue that will be less likely to instigate revolts. If rulers had perfect information about the probability of revolt at various levels of taxation, and if the costs of revolt were always greater than the benefits of tax increases, rulers would always set taxes at the highest level that would not incite revolt and we would find no correlation between levels of taxation and revolt. First, however, rulers did not have perfect information, and thus would be expected to miscalculate in setting tax rates, thus sometimes triggering revolts.7 Second, even when rulers did have good information, there were some instances in which the gains from raising taxes or the costs of not doing so outweighed the costs of revolts, and rulers chose to increase taxes even if they thought revolt was a likely result. The most common early modem example is from international relations: Rulers could have an opportunity to begin or continue an unusually profitable offensive war, or fear a very costly invasion. Thus, for both of these reasons, we expect a positive relationship between levels of taxation and the frequency of revolts.
WAR AND REVOLT
Our primary argument about the effects of war on revolt is analogous to our argument about tax increases. Rulers want to pursue unpopular policies (those that serve their interests more than their subjects' interests), 7 Rulers would have to know the extent of the costs imposed on subjects by taxation (which will vary with population changes and the success of harvests), their military power relative to subjects, and the collective action capacity of subjects. Of course, as with rulers' decisions about increasing taxes and risking revolt, subjects' calculations that revolt will decrease taxes are made with incomplete information, and they are thus expected to miscalculate some proportion of the time.
but they realize that doing so can sometimes increase the likelihood of revolt. The lower the benefits to subjects provided by the current policy pursued by rulers (such as an unpopular war), the greater the potential benefit of a successful revolt that would alter or terminate that policy.
This allows us to specify the relationship between war and revolt more precisely-it should depend on the type of war.8 Levi (1988 Levi ( , 1997 argues that citizens often view defensive wars as public goods from which they would benefit and thus for which they are willing to pay taxes, while they do not generally support offensive wars. Hopcroft (1999:82) suggests that this was true in early modem Europe. Although it is notoriously difficult to find reliable data on the perceptions of historical actors (Tilly 1975:9; Weber 1968:5-6), there is a great deal of evidence that subjects thought that offensive wars were less beneficial and legitimate than defensive wars. Offensive wars were often seen as enriching monarchs, but not their subjects, and were thus more difficult to justify (Klaits 1976 Tilly 1975 Tilly , 1985 Tilly , 1990 Tilly , 1993 . This raises an obvious question: Are the different findings in the two literatures due to differences in the time periods studied or differences in the methods used? A quantitative analysis of an early modern state should help us find the answer. fensive wars had "rather dubious legal foundations" and were thus frequently criticized in political pamphlets. Monarchs also seem to have been aware of this difference. In a discussion of offensive wars in his memoirs, Louis XIV ([1661-1668]1970) notes that he fears "being accused of recklessness when he rushes voluntarily into complications" (p. 123), although this fear was clearly not sufficient to stop him. We thus expect the relationship between war and revolt to be stronger for offensive wars than for defensive wars.9 ADMINISTRATIVE CENTRALIZATION AND REVOLT Subjects will choose to pay their full tax bill only when the options available to them to reduce or eliminate tax payments are more costly. Revolt is certainly the most risky and potentially the most costly strategy for subjects who want to decrease their tax burden. Therefore, subjects are expected to revolt only when the costs of their other options are prohibitively high. The most important alternative available to subjects is tax evasion.
Subjects can attempt to evade taxes, either by concealing taxable assets or by colluding with tax collectors (e.g., offering bribes for lower tax assessments).10 Tax evasion will almost always be preferable to revolt because it entails less cost and risk, does not require collective action, and provides clear tangible benefits in the form of lower tax payments. Therefore, subjects are expected to revolt more often when the costs of tax evasion increase. The costs of tax evasion depend primarily on the effectiveness of rulers' tax administration apparatus. This is why both historians and sociologists argue that administrative centralization generated revolts (Barkey 1991 
THE HINGES OF HISTORY: TURNING POINTS IN STATE-MAKING AND REVOLT
Neither rulers nor subjects can be expected to have perfect information about the relationship between tax levels and revolt, so many revolts will occur as a result of rulers' or subjects' miscalculations (see Gartzke 1999 for a similar argument about the causes of war). It is difficult to predict when such miscalculations will occur in historical analyses because it would require detailed knowledge of the information available to rulers at the time. However, we can predict that rulers will learn from past miscalculations, especially large miscalculations that had clear outcomes (Lublinskaya 1968:256) . These events usually come in the form of major historical turning points (the "hinges" of history) in which the outcomes of revolts demonstrate to rulers (and subjects) either that future tax increases will not be beneficial for rulers (clearly successful revolts) or that revolting against taxes is likely to be an unsuccessful strategy in the future (clearly unsuccessful revolts). 9 We also test an alternative argument about the relationship between war and revolt. States are often weak during wars, and thus more likely to be targets of revolt (Beik 1985:186, 196-97; Kiser et al. 1993; Tilly 1990 Tilly :186, 1993 . Subjects will only revolt when they think the probability of the ruler capitulating or unsuccessfully using repression is greater than the probability of rulers successfully repressing the revolt. This argument stresses the opportunities that war provides to potential rebels by temporarily shifting the balance of power in their favor, thus increasing the probability of a successful revolt. Like social movements (Tarrow 1998 Figure 1 outlines the state-making and revolt game, combining the factors we have discussed in a model of sequential, strategic decisions. Rulers move first and decide whether to keep the tax rate the same or increase it, and what policies to pursue (specifically, whether to initiate an unpopular offensive war). Note that the "increase taxes" move also includes offensive war. We view these two moves as analytically similar-the tax rate specifies the costs to subjects, and the type of policy pursued determines the benefits. Throughout the game, subjects have three choices: pay, evade, or revolt (they are not entirely mutually exclusive, as subjects will generally choose some mix of pay and evade).
If the ruler does not increase taxes, subjects will continue to choose some mix of pay and evade (depending on the costs of evasion), just as they did in prior years. (This assumes the conditions affecting the tax collection process do not change.) We call this situation a "customary taxation equilibrium."
The more interesting developments follow from rulers' choices to increase taxes and pursue offensive wars, and these choices were the most common in early modern France. Subjects have the same three alternatives, but the payoffs for each are now quite different. The main effect of rulers choosing this strategy is to increase the costs of paying taxes or to decrease the benefits of the policies they fund. Therefore, both evasion and revolt become relatively more attractive.1 Subjects are expected to choose evasion more often (because it is less costly and less risky than revolt), but the frequency of revolt is expected to increase somewhat.
The game then proceeds along two separate lines, depending on whether subjects choose to evade taxes or revolt. If subjects choose revolt, rulers then have to choose between using repression or giving in to subjects' demands and lowering the tax rate. If they lower the tax rate, the game ends with payoffs similar to the customary tax equilibrium. If they use repression, there is some uncertainty about the outcome-will they defeat the rebels or not? The role of chance I ISubjects may still choose to pay the tax, if the costs of evasion and revolt are too high. This leads to an upward spiral, as rulers again increase taxes. This is not a stable equilibrium. Eventually, the costs of paying will be higher than either evading or revolting. Subjects will then choose one of these two options, pushing them down to the lower branches of the game tree, as discussed below ( is captured in game theory as a move by "nature"-either the repression is effective or it is not. If it is not, we return to something similar to the customary tax equilibrium. If it is successful, rulers are able to enforce the higher tax rate and their preferred policy choices. If subjects respond to tax increases or unpopular policies by increasing evasion, as we expect, rulers will attempt to increase the costs of evasion by centralizing administration. As with repression, there is an element of uncertainty regarding the outcome: Centralization may or may not be effective. This is again modeled as a move by "nature." If centralization is ineffective, the result is an outcome characterized by high tax rates and high evasion, with a net effect similar to the customary tax equilibrium. If centralization is effective, subjects face high costs for both paying and evading. This is the situation in which their last-resort option, revolt, becomes most likely.
Rulers respond to revolt either with repression or by conceding and lowering the tax rate. If they choose repression, it may or may not be effective (a move by "nature" as above). If it is not effective, the result is an unstable outcome characterized by high tax rates and frequent revolts. If it is effective, subjects will be forced to pay the higher tax rates and endure the unpopular policies chosen by rulers.
We argue that this last outcome, a high tax equilibrium, is what eventually happened in early modem France. Rulers often chose to increase taxes and fight unpopular offensive wars, especially in the seventeenth century. Subjects sometimes revolted, but most often increased their tax evasion. Rulers responded by centralizing, primarily with the use of intendants. This centralization was in part successful, and when it increased the costs of evasion, revolts became much more common, culminating in the largest revolt of all, the Fronde. Rulers successfully used repression against this revolt (and co-optation after it), thus convincing subjects that future revolts would be unlikely to succeed. The result was a high tax equilibrium after the Fronde, as French rulers were able to raise taxes and fight offensive wars with little resistance from their subjects. Our quantitative analy- Hoffman (1986 Hoffman ( , 1996 , and Rasler and Thompson (1989) .15 To arrive at a total tax amount for each year, it was sometimes necessary to extrapolate based on the data at hand. We have done this by (1) subtracting nontax revenue (revenue from crown lands and the sale of offices) from the total revenue figure for a given year, (2) aggregating data on all revenues contributing to total tax, or (3) carrying established figures from year to year.
Because we are interested in measuring the real tax burden that French citizens bore, we express taxation in terms of livres tournois (1. t.) per capita. '6 Ideally, we would include in our models a control for both real wages and taxpayers' other main expenses (such as rents and tithes), but we lack reliable and comprehensive data on these factors during the early modem period.'7 HISTORICAL TURNING POINT: THE FRONDE The Fronde was a large-scale set of revolts with a very clear outcome. The crown emerged victorious and the state subse- 13 In some cases, more than one revolt started in the same year (see Appendix A). An analysis in which revolt initiation is coded as the number of revolts beginning in a given year yields results that are substantively similar to the ones we report. 141 In earlier analyses, we found that coding revolt initiation according to revolt severity did not meaningfully alter our findings.
15 Direct taxation in early modern France took two main forms: the taille, levied on property, and capitation, levied on individuals. Collins (1988), Clamageran (1980) , Lewis (1968) , and Morineau (1968) offer considerable data on both of these. Indirect taxes primarily include a variety of tariffs such as the gabelle, a salt tax; aides, a tax levied on the consumption of a variety of products; and traites, duties paid when merchandise was imported and/or sold. 16 The population of France increased by over 10 million during the time span considered here. Dupaquier (1979) is our principal source of population data. We also use estimates by Bean (1973), Bonney (1979) , and Wilson and Parker (1977). When yearly estimates were unavailable or contradictory, we smoothed the data between benchmark figures, allocating an average rate of population increase/decrease per year (cf. Goldstone 1991). 17 To explore the possibility that tax revolts really reflected a more general resentment toward rising costs or shortages, we tested models including (1) the price of wheat, and (2) a standardized tax variable that reflects the amount of wheat, in setiers (a common measure of grain that ranged in volume from 150 to 300 liters), that could be purchased with the per capita tax revenue for a given year (Baulant 1968). The wheat price variable was never significant, even with per capita tax absent from the model. The results of models with standardized tax are very similar to those we report in Tables 1 and 2 , although overall model fit was poorer. We also investigated the possibility that subjects responded to nominal tax increases more than to the level of taxation (Goldstone 1991; Le Roy Ladurie 1980:263). The annual percent change in nominal or standardized taxes was never significant. This finding, however, does not conclusively discredit the proposition that tax increases prompted revolts-to do so would require additional case studies, preferably with better data. 3-4, 11-12 ). They were more careful not to disrupt traditional privileges, and they provided additional lucrative state jobs to those elites whose support they required (Lachmann and Adams 1988:155-58).
As our argument suggests, the one important result of this clear state victory, coupled with co-optation, is that potential rebels learned that revolt was likely to be unsuccessful, so they shifted to more cautious and covert forms of disobedience (Mettam 1988 (Markoff 1996:237) . Although direct tax collection was never fully centralized in early modern France (even the revolution did not totally change this), there was a major turning point in the seventeenth century: the use of intendants (Kettering 1986:6). Parker (1983) notes that intendants were the "principal agent through which the concentration of authority was effected" (p. 81; also see Collins 1995:53). The intendants were part of a long list of royal attempts to use ad hoc commissioned officials, centrally appointed and controlled, to supervise local tax collection (dating back to the medieval bailiffs). Although Richelieu used intendants, their numbers and their powers were significantly increased in 1642, when they were given full authority to supervise tax collection (Bonney 1988:82) . This was the most important administrative transformation in direct tax administration prior to the revolution, so we include a dummy variable for "administrative centralization" to capture this shift. 18 Tilly (1993) remarks that post-Fronde revolts were different in substance from earlier uprisings. Although nominally still tax revolts, they were more importantly protests against "the expense, arbitrariness, and corruption of the government" (p. 163). Both of these possibilities, pushing in opposite directions, are consistent with the microfoundations of our model. We thus have no clear prediction about the effects of representative institutions; it will depend on which effect is stronger. We include both national and provincial representative institutions as control factors.
The broadest of these institutions was the Estates General, a national legislative assembly comprised of representatives of the clergy, nobility, and the primarily bourgeois "third estate." It met intermittently until 1614, consulting kings on important matters such as war and taxes, and presenting lists of grievances. We therefore include a dummy variable for the existence of the Estates General, coded 1 prior to 1615, and 0 after that. We also explore the role of the provincial estates, even though we cannot include them in our regression analyses. In Table 4 , we note, by region, whether a provincial estate existed when revolts were initiated. We discuss the effects of provincial estates along with our regression results.
DATA ANALYSIS AND RESULTS

REVOLTS IN FRANCE: REGRESSION ANALYSES
Some degree of autocorrelation is common in time-series analysis. The logit regression model does not provide for unmeasured factors affecting the occurrence of revolts, nor does it allow for possible serial correlation due to the dependence of the observations. While this means that the estimates of the coefficients are not efficient, they are consistent (Robinson 1982 Table 2 test the degree to which the level of taxation, the Fronde, and administrative centralization influence the likelihood of revolt initiation. By itself, the level of taxation is negatively related to revolt initiation (Model 1). Taxes were highest in the eighteenth century; revolts were least frequent then. Models 2 and 3 incorporate a dummy variable for the period before and during the Fronde-alone and in interaction with taxation. Model 3 specifically examines the effect of the Fronde on the relationship between taxation and revolt initiation. The impact of taxation on the probability of revolt is positive before and during the Fronde, whereas after the Fronde it is not significant. This finding demonstrates quantitatively what many historians have argued-that the Fronde was indeed a key turning point in 20 We also ran a model of revolt initiation that included a lagged dependent variable (revolt initiation in the previous year), and found very similar results. The lag did not contribute significantly to any of our models. . This is easy to see graphically as well; although the Fronde divides the period covered in our study almost exactly in half, there were more than three times as many revolts prior to its conclusion than after it. As we argued above, the decisive defeat of the rebels signaled to all subjects that revolts were unlikely to be successful strategies for opposing taxation (Berce 1987 Table 3 explore the effects of representative institutions and wars on the probability of revolt. The odds of a revolt initiation were almost 50 percent lower in years when the Estates General convened. In Model 1, both a restraining effect of the Estates General and a positive before/duringthe-Fronde effect are prominent. Half of the revolt initiations that we consider occurred between 1616 and 1653-years before or during the Fronde, but after the Estates General ceased to meet. Including both "before and during the Fronde" and "Estates General" markers in the same model (Model 1) effectively shows that, although revolts were much more likely to take place before or during the Fronde, this was not the case when a central legislative body existed and met. This finding suggests that the Estates General worked not as a collective action mechanism facilitating revolt, but as a forum for negotiation and information exchange that provided a less costly alternative to revolt.
Although we could not include provincial estates in our regression analyses, we did gather data to assess their effects on revolt (see Table 4 ). Our data neither support our argument that their presence decreased revolts, nor Brustein and Levi's (1987) contention that they facilitated revolt. Rather, we find no significant difference in revolt initiation across provinces with and without provincial estates, or across time in areas where provincial estates met during only some of the years from 1514 to 1789. Table  4 shows that 17 tax revolts occurred in provinces where and at times when provincial estates met, whereas 18 took place where or when they did not. When we compare blocks of total province-years in which provincial estates met (3,544 years) and did not meet (7,681 years), we see that revolt initiations happened .46 percent of the time in the first block of years and .23 percent of the time in the second. Revolts thus seem to be slightly more likely when provincial estates were present, thus providing a bit more support for Brustein and Levi's view than for ours, but the difference is too small to be substantively significant. Getting back to Table 3 , Models 2 and 3 contrast two ways of measuring war.21 Model 2 considers all wars together; Model 3 separates offensive and defensive wars. Although the general war variable has the expected effect, comparison reveals that the type of war is of crucial importance: Offensive wars were responsible for the positive effect of war on revolt initiation. This test allows us to adjudicate between the three possible causal mechanisms linking war to revolt.
It seems clear now that the relationship between war and revolt was not entirely due to the costs of war. Although we unfortunately have no data on the costs of each war, there is no reason to expect offensive wars to be significantly more expensive, and this would be accounted for by the tax variable in any case. Nor is the relationship due only to the weakening of the state due to war, because if anything, defensive wars might be expected to weaken the state more (Tilly 1990:186; 1993:12) . The strong effect of offensive war in Model 3 suggests that subjects cared about how their tax money was spent. They were willing to pay for defensive wars that protected them from external threats, but not for offensive wars from which they expected few if any benefits and could pay very high costs (Hopcroft 1999; Klaits 1976 :87-88; Rowen 1980; Seyssel 1981:130-35). They seem to have thought that defensive wars were public goods, but that offensive wars served narrower interests (Levi 1988 (Levi , 1997 . Of course, it would take a detailed cultural analysis of subjects' reactions to different types of wars to fully demonstrate this, and that is beyond the scope of this paper.22 21 The Fronde variable approaches significance in these models (p = .080 in Model 2 and .068 in Model 5). 22 Buena de Mesquita, Silverson, and Woller (1992) report that the outcome of wars, in conjunction with who initiated them, has a strong effect on revolt. We tried a fourfold differentiation like theirs: successful offensive wars, lost offensive wars, successful defensive wars, lost defensive wars. We found, however, that whether an offensive (or defensive) war was won or lost did not change the relationships we report. Variables that reflect outcome were nonsignificant in our models.
Model 4 tests the proposition that the relationship between offensive wars-an unpopular policy-and revolt was weaker after the Fronde. Indeed, we find that offensive wars affect the likelihood of revolt only in the period before and during the Fronde.
Model 5 best fits the observed pattern of revolt initiations.23 It accounts for the combined effects of taxation, the Fronde, the Estates General, and wars. Here we see clear evidence of the multiple causal mechanisms linking state-making and revolts. Tax revolts were not simply a response to high taxes; they were facilitated or hindered by other factors that are key to the state-making process-notably offensive wars and the presence or absence of representative institutions. Figure 2 shows the geographic distribution of tax revolts in France in three periods: the reign of Francis I (1515-1548), the period between the death of Francis I and the beginning of the Fronde (1549-1648), and the years during and after the Fronde (1649-1789). In the first period, all of the revolts occur in the south and southwest. The two later periods show more geographical variation, although most revolts are still found in the south and southwest. This pattern has been documented and explained by Brustein and Levi (1987) and Hopcroft (1999) . Although our focus is on temporal variation, the geographic concentration of revolts in southern and southwestern France suggests that it would be wise to look more closely at these areas to provide an additional and more precise test of our arguments.
A PROVINCIAL CASE STUDY: REVOLTS IN GUYENNE
We selected the province with the highest rate of revolt in France, Guyenne -12 of the 36 tax revolts in early modern France occurred in this southwestern province. tendants were imposed, abolished, and then re-imposed several times between 1616 and 1653 (after which they remained in place).26
The elimination of representative institutions mattered less is Guyenne than elsewhere. Even when it was a Pays d'Etat, the provincial estates were always weak in Guyenne and were virtually eliminated after 1621 (Collins 1994:154; Major 1966:369; Parker 1983:81) .27
With these rough measures of our independent variables at the provincial level, we can now explore their effects on revolts in Guyenne. Taxes alone had little effect-revolts were instigated in 4.7 percent of the years prior to the major increases in 1623 and in 4.2 percent of the years after those tax increases. However, just as for France as a whole, adding the turning point of the Fronde clarifies the relationship between taxation and revolt. Revolts were three times as likely in Guyenne before the Fronde, and tax increases before the Fronde were over five times as likely to cause revolts as were tax increases after the Fronde (13 percent of years with tax increases resulted in revolts before the Fronde, compared with only 2.2 percent after the Fronde).
The effects of administrative centralization on revolts are similar-they too are highly conditioned by the Fronde. In the preFronde period, the imposition of indendants more than doubled the likelihood of revolt initiation (revolts started in about 13 percent of years with intendants but in less than 5 percent of years without intendants prior to the Fronde in Guyenne). Just as it did with tax increases, the Fronde virtually eliminates the relationship between administrative centralization and revolt-the use of intendants is more than five times more likely to produce revolt before the Fronde as after it.
War had a very strong effect on revolt in Guyenne-11 of the 12 revolts in Guyenne were initiated during a French war. Revolts were initiated in roughly 8 percent of years experiencing warfare, but in less than 1 percent of the peaceful years. Revolts were slightly more likely to occur during offensive wars, but that effect is not strong. Revolts were initiated in about 5 percent of years with offensive wars, and in 3.6 percent of years in which France was fighting a defensive war.
The presence of representative institutions had no effect on revolt in Guyenne. Neither the Estates General nor the provincial estates affected revolt initiation. (Because the provincial estates were always weak in Guyenne [Major 1966 ], we would not expect them to affect revolts.) Overall, our results at the provincial level are similar to those for France as a wholetaxation, administrative centralization, and war (especially offensive war) are important causes of revolts, and the effects of the first two factors interact strongly with the Fronde. Because these results are based on only a few cases (12 revolts) and very rough measures of some of our causal factors (i.e., taxation), we cannot make any strong conclusions based on this analysis of Guyenne. However, its consistency with our nationallevel findings provides good evidence for the robustness of our conclusions.
CONCLUSION
We model the relationship between statemaking and tax revolt as the product of strategic interactions between rulers and subjects. Both groups are making cost-benefit calculations in which an important part of the decision-making process is their anticipation of the actions of others. Neither rulers nor subjects have perfect information, so both are expected to miscalculate sometimes. However, both are also expected to learn over time, We find that the three main aspects of early modern state-making-war, tax increases, and administrative centralizationall incited tax revolts in early modern France. However, in each case, our findings show that these relationships are complex and often contingent on other factors.
Our initial analyses show an effect of war on revolt, but this effect operates only through offensive wars. When we decompose wars into offensive and defensive types, our quantitative results show that only offensive wars consistently generated revolts. Our provincial analysis of Guyenne also shows a slightly stronger effect of offensive wars. This is consistent with our hypothesis, but the effect is stronger than we anticipated. The opportunity for revolt (based on the weakness of the state) was clearly not all that mattered-subjects primarily reacted to how their tax money was being spent. When wars were fought to defend them, subjects were more willing to pay; when rulers pursued offensive wars that seemed to provide few benefits, subjects frequently revolted. As Levi (1988, 1997) argues, subjects' compliance is in part a function of whether they think the state is providing them with public goods or not.
These findings help us explain the difference between the strong effects of war on revolt found in most qualitative studies of early modern states and the weak effects found in quantitative studies of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Our quantitative analysis reinforces the qualitative findings for early modern states, and suggests that the early modern period is indeed different-that it is thus necessary to specify a scope condition for the relationship between war and revolt. Perhaps the relationship between warfare and revolt changes with the advent of nationalism in the nineteenth century (Hechter 2000) . When "subjects" are transformed into "citizens" with some stake in the wars of "their" country, a "rally 'round the flag" reaction may become more common than revolt. However, because our data do not extend to the nineteenth century, we cannot test this hypothesis.
Our control variable measuring the existence of representative institutions produced mixed results. The Estates General tended to suppress revolt in France as a whole, suggesting that it worked as a forum for negotiation and information exchange in early modem France, but it had no effect on revolts in Guyenne. Moreover, we found no effect for provincial estates-they did not affect revolts in Guyenne, and had virtually no effect in our rough analysis of France as a whole.
The effects of taxation and offensive war on revolt are complicated, due primarily to the existence of a significant historical turning point in our period. As we anticipated, the relationship between taxation and revolt was very different before the Fronde than after it. Prior to the Fronde, tax increases tended to generate revolts; after the Fronde they rarely did. The effects of offensive war on revolt are similar, in that they too were strongly affected by the Fronde. Offensive wars generated revolts prior to the Fronde. As with tax increases, the Fronde proved to be a decisive turning point-indicated in this case by the fact that offensive wars following the Fronde had no effect on revolt.
These findings clearly demonstrate that history matters. Particular historical turning points change the causal relationships between variables (Goldstone 1998 
